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NOTES AND COMMENTS
would have proper notice, and the attorneys' duties would be eased
and clarified.
HERBERT T. MITCHELL, JR.
Real Property-Riparian Rights
Because Y irrigated his cabbages and collards with the contam-
inated water of Beaverdam Creek, the North Carolina Commissioner
of Agriculture secured an injunction to prohibit the sale or disposition
of the crop. Y thereupon sued the defendant municipal corporations
for negligently permitting sewage to pollute the creek. The North
Carolina court reversed the judgment for damages below and said that
the motion for nonsuit should have been allowed.1 In the course of
the opinion the court stated that riparian rights were not established
in Y because he had no allegation in his complaint that he or his
lessor was a riparian proprietor, neither allegation nor proof that he
or his lessor had acquired a right to use the waters of the creek by pre-
scription or adverse use, nor proof that he or his lessor had authority
and license from an alleged riparian owner to use the water. The
court then raised two important questions by quaere: (1) What is the
physical extent of riparian land?2 (2) Can a riparian owner transfer
his riparian rights to a non-riparian owner 'for use on non-riparian'
land? This note is concerned with the problems raised by these ques-
tions.3
In the common law riparian states4 that have considered the first
question, two theories have developed concerning the physical extent of
riparian land. One doctrine is the watershed rule5 which requires land
' Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N. C. 619, 86 S. E. 2d 408 (1955).
'Land to be riparian must have the stream flowing over it or along its borders.
Stratbucker v. Junge, 153 Neb. 885, 46 N. W. 2d 486 (1951). The land must be
in actual contact with the water and mere proximity without contact is insufficient.
Kingsley v. Jacobs, 174 Ore. 514, 149 P. 2d 950 (1944).
Any treatment of the prior appropriation theory of water rights or of the
attainment of water rights by prescription or adverse use is beyond the scope of
this note. The doctine of prior appropriation- is that the one who first diverts and
applies to a beneficial use the waters of a stream has a prior right thereto, to the
extent of his appropriation. 56 AM. Jim., Waters § 291 (1947). Prescription or
adverse use is the acquiring of ownership of a water right by adverse use. The
use must be continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive under a claim of
right for the prescriptive period. 56 Am. JuR., Waters § 326 (1947).
'There are two separate and distinct systems of water rights in the United
States. One is the riparian doctrine which developed under the English common law.
The other is the prior appropriation doctrine which developed in the arid western
states of the United States. Generally the common law riparian doctrine is that
each riparian proprietor is entitled to have the water course flow by or through his
land in its natural course and quality, subject only to reasonable use by himself
and other riparian proprietors. The prior appropriation doctrine is the doctrine
that the first person to apply the water of a stream to a beneficial use is entitled
to the full flow of the stream, whether he is a riparian owner or not. Agnor,
Riparian Rights in the South Eastern States, 5 S. C. L. Q. 141, 143, 147 (1952).
'Research indicates that the following states have the watershed theory:
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to be within the watershed of a stream in order to enjoy riparian
rights.6 The principal reasons for this rule are that where water is
used on such lands it will, after use, return to the stream, and that as
the rainfall on such lands feeds the stream, the land is entitled, so to
speak, to the use of its water.7 Land beyond the watershed cannot be
regarded as riparian even though it is a part of a single tract abutting
the stream.8  Some states place a further limitation upon the applica-
tion of the watershed rule in requiring that title to the entire tract
must be acquired in one transaction. 9 Under this limitation subse-
quent acquisitions of land adjacent to the riparian land will not be
riparian even if contiguous ;10 and where land once conveyed is thereby
cut off from the riparian tract and stream, it can never regain the
riparian right although it may thereafter be reconveyed to the person
owning the riparian land.11
The watershed rule appears to work satisfactorily in a common
law riparian state where the test for a permissive use of riparian water
is a reasonable use on riparian land, with use on non-riparian land
being unlawful. The status of the land, whether riparian or non-
riparian, thus becomes an important preliminary question that must be
decided before even considering the reasonableness of the use.12
Arkansas: Harrell v. City of Conway, 271 S. W. 2d 924 (Ark. 1954). California:
Chauvet v. Hill, 93 Cal. 407, 28 Pac. 1066 (1892) ; Bathgate v. Irvine, 126 Cal.
135, 58 Pac. 442 (1889); Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88
Pac. 978 (1907) ; modified to allow use of surplus water on non-riparian land in
Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P. 2d 5 (1933) ; City of Pasa-
dena v. City of Alhambra, 180 P. 2d 699 (Cal. 1947) ; City of Pasadena v. City
of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P. 2d 17 (1949). Kansas: Clark v. Allaman,
71 Kan. 206, 80 Pac. 571 (1905). Kansas is now practically a prior appropriation
state having changed by statute which was upheld in Ex rel. Emery v. Knapp,
167 Kan. 546, 207 P. 2d 440 (1949). See Busby, American Water Rights
Law: A Brief Synopsis of Its Origin and Some of Its Broad Trends With Spe-
cial Reference to the Beneficial Use of Water Resources, 5 S. C. L. Q. 106, 127
(1952). Massachusetts: Sturtevant v. Ford, 280 Mass. 303, 182 N. E. 560 (1932) ;
Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N. E. 87 (1913). New
Jersey: McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 Atl. 489
(1906). South Dakota: Sayles v. City of Mitchell, 60 S. D. 592, 245 N. W. 390
(1932). Texas: Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273 (1927);
Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S. W. 733 (1905). Virginia:
Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S. E. 408 (1925) ; Town of
Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S. E. 508 (1921).
'A watershed is the boundary line between one drainage area and others.
Webster, International Dictionary, 2886 (2d Ed. 1940).
'Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 Pac. 978 (1907).
' Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 Pac. 978 (1907) ; Sayles
v. City of Mitchell, 60 S. D. 592, 245 N. W. 390 (1932).
' Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S. W. 733 (1905) ; Crawford
Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N. W. 781 (1903) ; Rancho Santa Margarita v.
Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P. 2d 533 (1938).
'0 Boehmer v. Big Rock Creek Irr. Dist., 117 Cal. 26, 48 Pac. 908 (1897).
" Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P. 2d 533 (1938) ; Years-
ley v. Cater, 149 Wash. 285, 270 Pac. 804 (1928).
1 Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S. E. 509 (1921).
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The main advantage of the watershed rule seems to be that it allows
a riparian owner to use riparian water on his land to the maximum
extent possible while at the same time protecting the lower riparian
owners, since the water after use will drain back into the stream from
which it was extracted.
The second doctrine defining the extent of riparian land developed
in Oregon.13 This theory is that the limit to riparian land is common
ownership and contiguity to the stream. The Oregon court said in
Jones v. Conn:14 "It is plainly not possible to define the distance to
which the riparian proprietor's right to use the water for irrigation or
other purposes extends, but this will depend upon the circumstances
of each case. The only general rule that can be laid down is that the
distance and use should be reasonable. . . . It would seem therefore
that any person owning land which abuts upon or through which a nat-
ural stream of water flows is a riparian proprietor, entitled to the rights
of such, without regard to the extent of his land, or from whom or
when he acquired titles."
This rules appears to have the practical advantage of extending the
riparian right to the greatest acreage under one ownership while still
protecting other riparian owners by requiring reasonable use.15 But
as Oregon now has virtually adopted the prior appropriation doctrine,
this rule doesn't seem to be of practical importance. 16
North Carolina has said that a riparian owner is one who owns the
land which the water covers or which forms its banks.17 In Young
v. City of Asheville'8 it was stated that land to be riparian must be in
actual contact with the stream, and that mere proximity without con-
tact is insufficient. Thus, although it seems clear that riparian land
in North Carolina is land touching or in actual contract with the
stream itself, whether it is merely one tract or extends to subsequent
acquisitions or is limited by the watershed is yet to be decided.
If in a future case the North Carolina court finds it necessary to
define the exact physicial extent of riparian land, it is hoped that the
policy adopted will be one of protecting the lower riparian owner
while still allowing maximum usage of the riparian water consistent
" Apparently Oregon has been the only state to follow this doctrine. Jones v.
Conn., 39 Ore. 30, 64 Pac. 855 (1901), rehearing denied 39 Ore. 46, 65 Pac. 1068
(1901).
11 Id. at 39, 64 Pac. at 858.
Ir Note, 27 MIcE. L. Rxv. 479 (1929).
"' See Busby, American Water Rights Law: A Brief Synopsis of Its Origin and
Some of Its Broad Trends With Special Reference to the Beneficial Use of Water
Resources, 5 S. C. L. Q. 106, 127 (1952) ; Maloney, The Balance of Convenience
Doctrine in the South Eastern States, Particularly as Applied to Water (Ad-
dendum), 5 S. C. L. Q. 159, 180 (1952).
7 City of Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N. C. 615, 54 S. E. 453 (1906);
Pugh v. Wheeler, 19 N. C. 50 (1832).18 241 N. C. 618, 86 S. E. 2d 408 (1955).
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with this protection. The rule allowing a riparian owner to use water
on his land within the watershed seems to achieve this result.
May a riparian owner transfer his riparian right to a non-riparian
owner to use on non-rip~arian land?19 The majority of the common
law riparian states that have considered this problem say that no legal
right exists in a riparian owner for the use of the riparian water
beyond his riparian land.20  Any such use is an infringement upon
the rights of the lower riparian owners ;21 and since a riparian owner
cannot exercise any right of use on non-riparian land, he cannot, as
against a lower riparian owner, confer it upon another.2 2  However,
as between himself and his grantee, the riparian owner is estopped to
prevent the non-riparian use.23  The lower riparian owner is allowed
to enjoin any diversion of water to non-riparian land in order to pre-
vent the diversion from growing into a prescriptive right.2 4  Some
states qualify this rule by requiring the lower riparian owner to show
actual injury before he can prevent the diversion.25
1" A riparian owner does not own the water of a stream but he owns a usufruc-
tuary right which is the right of reasonable use of the water. Rancho Santas
Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P. 2d 533 (1938).
20 California: Gould v. Stafford, 77 Cal. 66, 18 Pac. 879 (1888); Miller &
Lux v. Madera Canal & Irrigation Co., 155 Cal. 59, 99 Pac. 502 (1909) ; modified
to allow use of surplus water on non-riparian lands in Chow v. City of Santa
Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P. 2d 5 (1933) ; City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra,
180 P. 2d 699 (Cal. 1947) ; City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908,
207 P. 2d 17 (1949). Connecticut: Harvey Realty Co. v. Borough of Walling-
ford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 Atl. 60 (1930); Williams v. Wadsworth, 51 Conn. 277(1884). Georgia: Hendrix v. Robert Marble Co., 175 Ga. 389, 165 S. E.
223 (1932) ; Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178, 63 S. E. 897 (1909). Massachusetts:
Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N. E. 87 (1913).
Massachuetts allows diversion to non-riparian land if there is no actual injury to
lower riparian owners for any present or future use. New Jersey: McCord v. Big
Brothers Movement, 185 Atl. 480 (N. J. 1936). Pennsylvania: Lackawanna Mills
v. Scranton Gas & Water Co., 300 Pa. 303, 150 Ati. 633 (1930) ; Scranton Gas &
Water Co. v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 240 Pa. 604, 88 Atl. 24 (1913). South
Dakota: Sayles v. City of Mitchell, 60 S. D. 592, 245 N. W. 390 (1932). Texas:
Woody v. Durham, 267 S. W. 2d 219 (Texas 1954); Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117
Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273 (1927) ; Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86
S. W. 733 (1905). Texas allows use of surplus water on non-riparian land.
Virginia: Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S. E. 2d 700 (1942);
Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S. E. 508 (1921). West Virginia:
Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S. E. 535 (1913). Washington: Hunter
Land Co. v. Laigenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41 (1926) ; Brown v. Chase, 125
Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923); Mally v. Weidensteiner, 88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac.
342 (1915) ; Town of Kirkland v. Cochrane, 87 Wash. 528, 151 Pac. 1082 (1915).
Washington allows use of surplus water on non-riparian lands.
21 Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S. E. 535 (1913) ; Town of Purcellville
v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S. E. 2d 700 (1942).
" Gould v. Eaton, 117 Cal. 539, 49 Pac. 577 (1897); Kennebunk v. Maine
Turnpike Authority, 147 Me. 149, 84 A. 2d 433 (1951).
23 Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206, 110 Pac. 927(1910) : Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273 (1927).
"' Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. 1124, 211 Pac. 11 (1922) ; Anaheim Union Water
Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 Pac. 978 (1907).
" "The question in such a case is not whether the diversion, being for a legiti-
mate use, is in quantity such as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances
(Vol. 34
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This rule confines the use of riparian water strictly to riparian land
and prohibits its use on non-riparian land either by a riparian owner
or his grantees as against a lower riparian owner. Although this rule
protects the lower riparian owner, it doesn't seem to answer the policy
question of why a non-riparian owner who needs water should not be
allowed to use it, where there is a surplus in the stream that would
run unused into the sea.
Apparently to prevent this waste of water and to promote maximum
usage, a group of states, who once followed the doctrine above, have
modified it either by constitutional amendment or by statutory change
so as to allow appropriation of surplus water for beneficial use on non-
riparian land.2 6  Therefore, in Texas Co. v. Burkett,2 it was held that
the riparian owner has the right to divert water to non-riparian land
where water is abundant and no possible injury could result to lower
riparian owners. But in Smith v. Wheeler,28 in an action for injunction
against diversion of water from riparian land to non-riparian land, it was
said that the burden was on the defendant to prove the existence of sur-
plus water.
This group of states seems to have achieved a desirable balance be-
tween protecting the riparian owner while still promoting maximum
usage of water so as to prevent waste. If a state having a history of
common law decisions holding that riparian water cannot be used on
non-riparian land is to adopt the modified doctrine of the above states,
it should probably do so by statute or constitutional amendment.
A minority group of states allows riparian water to be used on non-
riparian land.29 This is done by treating the fact of use on non-riparian
land as merely another circumstance to consider in deciding the reason-
ableness of the use. As was said in Gillis v. Chase,30 it is simply
a question of fact whether the use of water by a riparian owner either
.. but only whether it causes actual damage to the person complaining." Strat-
ton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N. E. 87 (1913); "The
riparian owner has the right to divert riparian water to non-riparian land, where
water is abundant and no possible injury could result to lower riparian owners."
Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273 (1927).
". California: City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207
P. 2d 17 (1949); City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 180 P. 2d 699 (Cal.
1947) ; Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P. 2d 5 (1933). Nebraska:
Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N. W. 781 (1903). Texas: Woody
v. Durham, 267 S. W. 2d 219 (Tex. 1954); Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16,
296 S. W. 273 (1927) ; Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S. W. 733
(1905). Washington: Hunter Land Co. v. Laigenour, 140 Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41
(1926); Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923).27117 Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273 (1927).
28107 Cal. App. 2d 451, 237 P. 2d 325 (1951).
.New Hampshire: Poire v. Serra, 106 A.'2d 39 (N. H. 1954) ; Gillis v. Chase,
67 N. H. 161, 31 Atl. 18 (1891). Oklahoma: Smith v. Stanolina Oil & Gas Co.,
197 Okla. 499, 172 P. 2d 1002 (1946). Vermont: Kasuba v. Graves, 109 Vt. 191,
194 Atl. 455 (1937) ; Lawrie v. Silsby, 82 Vt. 505, 74 AUt 94 (1909).
20 67 N. H. 161, 31 Atl. 18 (1891).
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for his own purposes or for sale to others, is under all the circum-
stances a reasonable one. The mere fact his grantees are taking water
to their non-riparian land does not per se make their use unreasonable
but that fact together with the size and character of the stream, the
quantity appropriated, and all the circumstances may make the use un-
reasonable.8 '
Before following the above rule it should be considered that of the
three states presently adhering thereto, two states, New Hampshire
and Vermont, regard their non-navigable streams as practically pub-
lici juris32 while the third state, Oldahoma,38 follows the theory with
the aid of a statute.
In Pugh v. Wheeler,34 North Carolina recognized the reasonable
use doctrine. 5 The North Carolina Supreme Court stated in Harris
v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.36 that a riparian owner may use water
for any purpose to which it can be beneficially applied, provided he
does not inflict substantial injury on those below him. Then in Dun-
lap v. Carolina Power & Light Co.37 the court further stated that a
riparian owner has a right to make all the use he can of the stream as
long as he does not pollute it or divert it from its natural channel and
abstract so much of the water as to prevent others from having equal
enjoyment with himself or does not use the same in such an unreason-
able manner as to materially damage or destroy rights of other riparian
owners. Does the court mean that the reasonable use doctrine ap-
plies only to use on riparian land and that any use on non-riparian
land that substantially injures lower riparian owners is unlawful?
Or does it mean that the reasonable use doctrine applies to use on both
riparian and non-riparian land and that such use on non-riparian land
is just another factor in deciding the reasonableness?
It would seem that since North Carolina does not have a statute de-
fining the rights of riparian owners, and that since our non-navigable
streams are not publici juris,-8 that our court should not follow the lead
of those states allowing use of riparian water on non-riparian land
under the theory that such use is just another factor in deciding the
3182 Vt. 505, 74 Atl. 94 (1909).
'
2 Annot. 14 A. L. R. 330 (1921).
"Smith v. Stanolina Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 172 P. 2d 1002 (1946).
"19 N. C. 50 (1832).
""What constitutes a reasonable use is a question of fact having regard to the
subject matter and the use; the occasion and manner of its application; its object
and extent and necessity; the nature and size of the stream; the kind of business
to which it is subservient; the importance and necessity of the use claimed by one
party, and the extent of the injury caused by it to the other." Dunlap v. Carolina
Power & Light Co., 212 N. C. 814, 820, 195 S. E. 43, 47 (1938).
36153 N. C. 542, 69 S. E. 623 (1910).
3212 N. C. 814, 195 S. E. 43 (1938).
" State v. Glenn, 52 N. C. 321 (1859); Pugh v. Wheeler, 19 N. C. 50 (1832).
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reasonableness. If such a result is desired, it should be left to the
legislature.
If North Carolina does not allow a riparian owner to use riparian
water on non-riparian land, then it probably will not allow the riparian
owner to convey such a right that he does not have.
JAMEs A. ALSPAUGH.
Torts-Breach of Contractual Duty as Negligence
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently affirmed a ruling
of the superior court striking portions of a complaint relating to a con-
tract between the defendants and a third party as irrelevant to the issue
of actionable negligence.' The complaint charged the defendants with
negligence in performance of their plumbing contract with the Board of
Education of Mecklenburg County, with which the plaintiff had a con-
tract for the general construction work in the erection of a new school
building, the same building for which the defendants were to do the
plumbing. The plaintiff's cause of action was that defendants performed
their contract negligently, resulting in broken water lines which flooded
the foundations of the building, causing large sections of the walls and
underpinning erected by the plaintiff to cave in and break off, and there-
by necessitating their repair by the plaintiff.
Upon motion by defendants, allegations in the complaint referring to
many sections of the plumbing contract were striken by the trial court.
The plaintiff's appeal challenged the striking of these allegations. In
affirming this ruling, the Court recognized that in an action for negli-
gence it is competent to allege and prove the existence of a contract for
the purpose of showing the relationship of the parties out of which
arises the common law duty to use ordinary care, but held that it is not
competent to allege specific terms of the contract as a standard for
measuring the defendant's conduct.2
There is a liberal doctrine in North Carolina whereby an injured
plaintiff may sue in tort for damages caused by the defendant's breach
of a contract, even though the plaintiff is not a party thereto.3 The
plaintiff was allowed to sue for breach of contract as a third party bene-
ficiary in the case of Gorrell v. Water Supply Co.,4 where the complaint
alleged a contract between the defendant, the Greensboro Water Supply
Co., and the City of Greensboro for furnishing the city with water for
1 Pinnix v. Toomey, 242 N. C. 358, 87 S. E. 2d 893 (1955).2 Id. at 363, 87 S. E. 2d at 898.
' Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896); Bond & Willis v.
Hilton, 44 N. C. 308 (1853); Robinson v. Threadgill, 35 N. C. 39 (1851).
'124 N. C. 328, 32 S. E. 720 (1899). See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home
Water Supply Co., 226 U. S. 220 (1912) ; Guardian Trust Co. v. Fisher, 200 U. S.
57 (1905).
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